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ABSTRACT It is commonly assumed that the European Union (EU) influences
sub-national authorities (SNAs), but it is not clear exactly to what extent and how it
does this. Some scholars conclude that the EU strengthens SNAs (e.g. by funding),
others claim that the EU weakens them (e.g. by rules). This article presents a theoretical
framework in which various forms of enhancing and constraining effects are repre-
sented, and by which the empirical merits of the contesting points of view can be
assessed. The research was conducted in two municipalities and one province in the
Netherlands, by detailed study of their administrative practice. The research shows that
the EU influences sub-national decision making to a fairly large extent, that some of this
influence can be concurrently constraining as well as enhancing and that the influence
of the EU at the local level is predominantly enhancing and indirect, while at the
provincial level it is predominantly constraining and direct.
KEY WORDS: Decision making, European directives, Europeanization, local and 
regional government, local autonomy, structural funds
Introduction
Among political scientists and scholars of public administration there is wide
attention paid to the effects of European integration and of Europeanization
on national administrative systems. In the current discourse some advocate
that due to Europeanization regions have gained a stronger position towards
central government (Sharpe 1993; John 2001). Others find national central
Correspondence Address: F. Fleurke, Department of Public Administration and Organization
Science, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1081, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The
Netherlands. Email: f.fleurke@fsw.vu.nl
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level is losing prominence in favour of the European Union (EU), since
national legislation increasingly has its origins in EU policies. Hooghe &
Marks (2001) stressed the emergence of (non-governmental) networks and
multi-level governance in which no actor dominates permanently. Other
scholars have investigated how nations adapt their policy making towards
processes of Europeanization (e.g. Cole & Drake 2000) and to what extent
such practices show a convergent or divergent trend among European coun-
tries (Börzel 1999).
A specific part of the Europeanization literature focuses on the effects of
the EU on the position of sub-national authorities (SNAs). However, there
does not seem to exist broad consensus on the nature of these effects.
Roughly said, the different points of view are: the EU has strengthened SNAs,
has weakened SNAs, or does not make any difference (see e.g. Bourne 2003).
Though all three positions have been substantiated with empirical data,
existing literature has — as will be shown later in this paper — a certain bias
or it turns out to be less conclusive than suggested. Moreover, common to
the three perspectives is the lack of a systematic approach in which possible
enhancing and constraining EU effects are considered simultaneously, and of
a thorough analysis of daily administrative practice at sub-national level. The
latter, in particular, is striking, since it is often assumed that European legis-
lation is increasingly penetrating the daily work of the administrations
within the national states (e.g. Page 1998). This also came up in the debates
that followed the French non and the Dutch nee in the referenda on the Euro-
pean constitution. This paper tries to fill the existing lacunas by addressing
the following question: ‘To what extent and how does European policy and
legislation influence sub-national decision making?’. To assess the amount of
influence of the EU on sub-national decision making and, allied to this, the
relative importance of the different ways Europe is influencing the autonomy
of SNAs, three cases in the Netherlands were researched.
Literature on EU Effects and Sub-National Decision Making
Enhancement, Constraints or No Effects
In the discussion on the effects of the EU three positions can be discerned: it
strengthens the position of SNAs, it weakens their position, or it makes no
difference (cf. Bourne 2003). Among the proponents of the first position are
found Hooghe & Marks. Central to their work on multi-level governance is
the idea that governmental power is no longer concentrated within one single
organization, but that it is shared between different actors at different levels.
Governance and networks are the dominant concepts that have marginalized
the concept of government. Concretely, this means that — since European
decision making increasingly acquires supranational traits — central
governments are increasingly losing control. That this is not leading to an
omnipotent European level, is due to the EC’s way of decision making which
increasingly involves authorities on the sub-national level, bypassing central
governments (Hooghe & Marks 2001). The establishment of the European
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Committee of the Regions and negotiations with SNAs on regional funds are
often-mentioned illustrations (see Hooghe 1996; Marks et al. 1996; Scharpf
1997; Peters & Pierre 2001; Hooghe & Marks 2003). Similarly, SNAs are
increasingly proactive in serving their interests in Europe without the
necessary support of central government, as is witnessed by the rise of tran-
snational cooperative networks between European regions, and the increase
in sub-national lobby offices established in Brussels (Hooghe & Marks 2001;
Ercole et al. 1997). These observations are in line with the so-called hollow
state thesis. This thesis implies a relative strengthening of the position of the
SNAs towards central government induced by the opportunities the EU
offers to SNAs and, as a result, the increasingly weaker position of central
government (cf. Rhodes 1997).
Based on the same observations one might also defend the position that the
EU has enhanced SNAs, irrespective of possible changes in the position of
central government or in the SNAs’ relation with the tier above. The
Commission’s regional policy offers a new arena in which central govern-
ments do not, as yet, play a prominent role. Consequently SNAs are
particularly enhanced with respect to their capabilities in the field of socio-
economics, which mainly determines the Commission’s regional policy. The
precise nature of this enhancement is twofold: there is enhancement in the
sense that SNAs are offered channels to express their interests in Europe, and
in the sense that the SNAs’ capacity to get things done for and in their
communities is increased. In the latter case, instead of constraining rules (as
may be conceived of as typical to traditional intergovernmental relations),
EU regional funding that is ‘showered’ on SNAs is finally enabling them to
perform certain previously unattainable activities.
A second view on the effects of the EU on the position of SNAs is
predominantly constitutional and states that, briefly put, European integra-
tion “undermines legal and constitutional arrangements guaranteeing
regional autonomy” (Bourne 2003, 59; also Bullain 1998). The main
reason is the EU’s institutional bias against regions; central governments are
the first with whom the Commission deals and in the EU’s supreme body —
the European Council — representation is by central governments. It is also
central government that is responsible for the implementation of European
directives at the sub-national local level and therefore it will be held
accountable for any failures made by lower governments. As a consequence
a gradual (re)recentralization will be seen: central government will tighten
its control over SNAs, diminishing regional and local autonomy (Fleurke &
Hulst 2003, 58–65).
The EU does not only constrain sub-national autonomy indirectly via its
influence on national constitutional or other general legal arrangements.
According to national legal studies European directives are of importance to
SNAs. These studies mainly hypothesize the procedural effects of directives
and, to a lesser extent, the substantive impact. This top-down carry-over of
European legislation may be direct (e.g. the obligation to report the support
of ailing firms to the Commission), or indirect; through its implementation
in national legislation (e.g. waste policies; Sieben & Ziller 1989; Hessel
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2000; Lefeber 2000). The EU therefore also constrains sub-national auton-
omy indirectly or directly through its legislation.
Bourne (2003) discerned a third general position, which states that in the
end there are no substantial effects of the European integration on SNAs.
This intergovernmentalist approach — of which Moravcsik (1993) is a main
representative — stresses the supremacy of the national states in interna-
tional deliberations and decision making. According to this view the
European institutions are seen as agents of the national states rather than as
autonomous political actors (Bourne 2003, 602). If regional governments
have the opportunity to raise their voice in Europe this is prescribed by
central government. The idea of central government as a gatekeeper rules out
the possibility of sub-national governments as independent political actors in
the European arena.
Critical Remarks
Returning to the initial research question, what do the approaches
mentioned above tell us about the impact of the EU on sub-national decision
making? Up until now, ambiguity rules in the literature concerned. This
ambiguity is partially a result of the selection of essentially different objects
of analysis. The enhancement and ‘no difference’ positions have specific
policy networks or alliances as objects, whereas the constraints hypothesis
emphasizes constitutional and other legal arrangements. Also, the specific
choice of networks to be studied biases the final conclusion. If one chooses
to study, for example, the European cohesion policy (like Hooghe 1996), one
is very likely to find benefits for regional governments. Similarly, a focus on
Europe’s foreign policy neglects the supranational authority the EU increas-
ingly has on other fields. Moreover, the gatekeeper’s role is not as dominant
as the intergovernmentalists suggest, nor does multi-level governance prevail
(Bache 1998). Since many European directives are regulative (especially
those concerning the environment), a focus on European legislation may lead
easily to support for the constraints hypothesis, whereas a focus on rules
regarding the allocation of money or competencies may obscure the
constraints and highlight the opportunities.
Also, commonly made case selections tend to be restricted to a specific
SNA within a certain type of administrative system. Yet, processes of Euro-
pean enhancement or constriction might differ from one system to the other,
which is often neglected in the relevant literature. First, regions in some states
may profit more from the European cohesion policy or from the existence of
a European arena than regions in other states. Further, depending on their
constitutional competences or attributed tasks, SNAs in certain countries
have more opportunities in dealing with the European Commission than
SNAs in other countries (see also Jeffery 2000). For example, in a centralized
system that leaves little space to SNAs for activities in the socio-economic
field (as in French communes), the concerned SNA will be confronted less by
European measures than in a region that has the discretion to pursue an
active employment and socio-economic policy (such as a German Land).
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Also, the direction of European influence may be different in various systems.
In some (centralized) systems European rules may constrain SNAs indirectly
via implementation in central legislation which, in turn, affects SNAs, while
in others (less centralized systems) SNAs may be confronted by European
rules more directly.
Another consequence of the differences in selection of objects of analysis
is that subsequent statements on the impact of the EU on the actual position
of SNAs are derivative. However convincingly beneficial a transnational
alliance may seem for a certain region, it remains best to assess whether it
actually profits at the regional level itself. Studying central government regu-
lation, Fleurke & Willemse (2006b, 72) posed that “legal indices generate
information about the potency of instruments of central government, rather
than give a clear insight into the actual autonomy of local government”. This
may hold equally for European directives and other rules.
Several authors have met this objection by studying SNAs themselves. For
example, Wolters (1997) and Wollman & Lund (1997) assessed the actual
extent to which SNAs receive European structural funds. Goldsmith (1993)
studied whether local governments appointed a special civil servant or set up
a civil service department solely entrusted with European affairs. Balme &
LeGalès (1997) and Goldsmith & Sperling (1997) analysed the extent to
which SNAs perceive the need to lobby in Brussels. Von Bergmann-Winberg
(1997) studied the extent to which SNAs absorb the information about and
rules from the EU, as did De Rooij (2002) and Hoetjes et al.(2003). All stud-
ies have shown positive outcome on the used indicators, though the impact
of Europe is definitely not equally strong in every country or even in different
SNAs within one member state (Klausen & Goldsmith 1997; Martin &
Pearce 1999; Cole & John 2001). None of the studies have systematically
analysed the effectiveness of the SNAs’ activities in and towards the EU.
The variety in used indicators of European influence notwithstanding, the
existing literature does not offer a comprehensive picture. Most studies
analyse large SNAs, such as the German Länder or the Lille region, or cities
that obviously have large economic interests in Europe (e.g. port cities such
as Marseille or Rotterdam). Case studies on smaller SNAs hardly exist, with
the notable exception of the study of De Rooij (2002) who also analysed
municipalities of around 5,000 inhabitants (where he found no European
influences). Alternatively, Martin & Pearce (1999) have performed a survey
among all kinds of British local authorities, therby avoiding the risk of a bias
through case selection. They found a large differentiation in how local
authorities respond to the EU. Unfortunately, their study suffers from a
deficiency in common with the literature on the enhancement hypothesis:
they fail to take into account opportunities and constraints simultaneously.
Many observers tend to reduce the meaning of the EU to a potential money-
bag, whereas the legal literature shows there may be constraints as well.
Indeed, these may even compensate for or outnumber the benefits a particu-
lar SNA reaps from European integration.
In order to obtain a well-balanced insight in the actual enhancing and
constraining influence of the EU on SNAs one needs to carry out empirical
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research into daily administrative practice itself. Possible effects should not
be hypothesized or reasoned, but measured or assessed. Before proceeding
with such an approach, an analytical framework must be created within
which the actual impact of the EU on sub-national decision making can be
described and assessed and in which possible enhancing or constraining
effects are combined. This enables assessment of the empirical merits and
scope of each of the contesting positions as described in the existing
literature.
Conceptual Framework
Autonomy of SNAs
Central to the framework is the distinction between enhancing and
constraining European influence on the autonomy of SNAs. In relation to the
EU, autonomy is considered to have three indicators: 
• “sub-national decision-making is free from European enforced executive
tasks;
• sub-national policy can be implemented without obligations of European
co-operation, or permission from or compliance to restrictive European
rules;
• sub-national policy can be prepared without the need to overcome barriers
raised by European rules and directives” (Fleurke & Willemse 2006a, 89).
As a mirror of each of the constraints implied in the indicators mentioned
above, their antipodes are also considered, that is three opportunities with
which sub-national decision making can be enhanced. This results in three
twin concepts. With regard to each concept a distinction will be made
between a direct and indirect effect of the EU regulation in question. Thus,
the conceptual framework consists of twelve possible ways the EU steers the
decision making of SNAs.
Three Twin Concepts
A first twin concept is enforcement & invitation. In the case of enforcement,
the EU compels an authority to undertake a decision it would not have taken
otherwise. By doing this, the EU sets the local or regional agenda and the
SNA acts as its executive agent, a situation from which it cannot withdraw.
We speak of a direct enforcement if a SNA is bound to European regulation
without intervention of the state. An example of indirect enforcement is the
planning of ecologically important areas. The EU aims to preserve these areas
through the Habitat Directive, applied to territories designated by the
member states. In a hierarchical physical planning system central govern-
ment may force SNAs to adjust their zoning plans to the Habitat Directive.
In the case of invitation, the EU sets the local agenda and the SNA has the
possibility of withdrawing from the European incentive, but the incentive is
sufficiently attractive as to warrant taking the according decision. A decision
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to set up a lobby office in Brussels is an example of a direct invitation. An
appeal to EU funds allocated by central government is an example of indirect
invitation, but only insofar as it concerns a brand new project developed in
order to receive European funding.
The second twin concept is hampering & facilitation. A sub-national deci-
sion can be called hampered if it can be implemented only with the necessary
cooperation or permission of the EU, or if European rules limit the discretion
in the formulation or implementation of a policy. An example of direct
hampering is the reconstruction of a concert hall costing over €500,000
which, according to European law, must be tendered publicly. We speak of
an indirectly hampered decision, e.g. in a zoning plan of a municipality that
includes a new recreational waterway, in which changes are ordered by the
regional Water Board. This Board in turn takes its directives from EU
regulation, for example the Water Directive.
The same European regulations that may hamper sub-national decision
making may also facilitate decision making in the broadest possible sense.
Initially Fleurke & Willemse (2006a) used the concept of improvement, but
in order to prevent ending up in a normative discussion on what is good or
bad according to whom, the term facilitation is now preferred — with its
more neutral connotation. An example of a directly facilitated decision is
when local officials welcome the obligation of a public tender because it
reduces the risk of clientelism and because it realizes a free market. European
financial impetus can also facilitate decision making, for example in the case
of an already planned and designed project that can be extended and carried
out more quickly because of the extra funding. The question of whether the
plans already existed and would have been carried out anyway — though on
a smaller scale — is the essential difference with invited decision making
(where the plan is newly developed). If a higher government tier has allocated
the EU money, it is called an indirectly facilitated decision.
The third twin concept is obstruction & enabling. Obstructed decisions
may exist in two forms. First as a non-decision, or put differently, a widely
supported policy desire that cannot be fulfilled because of European legisla-
tion. An example of a directly obstructed decision is the banning of govern-
ment support to ailing firms following European rules on fair trade; the idea
of support will therefore never be developed. In the second form of obstruc-
tion, ideas are maturing and find their way to the drawing board, but in the
end do not result in a final, formal decision. An example is the inclusion of a
new recreational waterway in a zoning plan — perceived as necessary for the
tourist development of the area — which is later overruled by the province
because it is adverse to the EU Bird Directive: this is an indirectly obstructed
decision (compare the idea of hampering, in which case the water way will
be constructed but in an adjusted manner). As an adaptation of the initial
framework of Fleurke & Willemse (2006a), obstruction does not necessarily
lead only to (formal) non-decision making, but may also imply (halfway)
unfinished or abandoned decision making.
An enabled decision is an unattainable desire (a situation of non-decision
making) that can be fulfilled with the support of the EU. The decisive
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difference between this and an invited or facilitated decision is that a
preceding situation of unwanted non-decision making has occurred. An
example of a directly enabled decision concerns a SNA suffering a chronic
lack of money as a result of which it cannot pursue a highly desired policy
to restructure the regional economy. European funds for regional policy
may enable the SNA to finally develop new initiatives. In the case where
EU funds are distributed by central government (such as the employment
subsidies of the European Social Fund), these are indirectly enabled deci-
sions.
These concepts are summarized in Table 1.
Method
Case Selection
To assess the extent to which the various types of European effects
mentioned above occur in daily practice, an analysis of the decision making
in all major policy areas of three sub-national governments in the Nether-
lands was performed. The empirical research is not only characterized by the
width of the object, but also by its perspective. The local level is taken as the
object of research and local decision making is related to possible direct and
indirect European influence. In other words, empirically there is a local
approach, but conceptually a top-down perspective.
The data presented in this paper were collected in the Dutch municipalities
of Almere (pop. 159,000) and Lelystad (pop. 70,000). These two cities are
situated on land reclaimed in the 1950s and 1960s and are among the largest
in the Netherlands (respectively 179km2 and 764 km2). Lelystad and Almere
were chosen because large parts of these municipalities consist of or are
situated nearby a valuable natural area (the Oostvaardersplassen, the
Table 1. Three twin concepts
Constraint or opportunity Direct or indirect
Type of sub-national 
decision in relation to the EU
Enforcement Direct Directly enforced
Indirect Indirectly enforced
Invitation Direct Directly invited
Indirect Indirectly invited
Hampering Direct Directly hampered
Indirect Indirectly hampered
Facilitation Direct Directly facilitated
Indirect Indirectly facilitated
Obstruction Direct Directly obstructed
Indirect Indirectly obstructed
Enabling Direct Directly enabled
Indirect Indirectly enabled
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northernmost breeding place for spoonbills), which falls under the Habitat
Directive. They are further surrounded by fresh-water lakes, to which the
Bird Directive applies. These cities were also selected because they are situ-
ated in the only Dutch province that receives grants from the European Fund
for Regional Development: the province of Flevoland. The decision making
of this province was studied as well, in the same way as in both municipali-
ties. The province is an intermediate tier between central government and the
municipalities, it has several coordinative tasks and it acts as supervisor of
the municipalities. Studying both municipalities together with the province
in which they are situated may result in a clear picture of their intertwined
decision making.
An accusation of serious bias in the case selection could be made based on
the argument that the chance of finding European influence is much higher
here than in a study of SNAs ineligible for EU funding and located at a
distance from any bird sanctuary. However, this paper disregards the
average influence of the EU on SNAs and focuses rather on direct and tangi-
ble European policies and legislation, and on the extent and specific shape of
this influence. The case selection, then, although it is restricted to only three
specific SNAs within a certain type of administrative system (see earlier),
offers the opportunity to assess the amount of influence of the EU on sub-
national decision making and, allied to this, the relative importance of
European constraints vis-à-vis opportunities, which would not be likely with
random selection.
Unit of Analysis: Files
What will be the unit of analysis if all local decision making is to be studied
in the three cases? Study was not made of separate decisions taken by a
specific municipal or provincial body (cf. Fleurke & Willemse 2006b), but
instead it was decided to study files. In archive terms a file consists of several
records concerning the same subject or project. A file is defined as a relatively
isolated group of interrelated decisions and/or activities serving a specific
goal and taken and performed by or within the apparatus of a government.
‘Relatively isolated’ means that the implementation of the policy and
decisions is more or less independent of other files. Caution is adopted in the
formulation because it is acknowledged that ultimately (any decision in) any
file is circumscribed by the parameters set in the overall budget. Yet,
conceptually it is possible to discern between groups of decisions where the
implementation of one group does not fundamentally affect the implementa-
tion of the other. ‘A specific goal’ means that the decisions or activities
should serve a certain desired output or outcome or the performance of a
certain municipal or provincial task. ‘Interrelated’ decisions that make up a
file mean that a specific decision could not have been taken without another
decision in the same file or that a decision influences another one in the same
file.
Using this definition, the annual budget would not be considered as a file,
but as consisting of a number of files. A zoning plan will be considered a file
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insofar as it cannot be split into separate files such as partial plans. A plan to
restructure the city centre that consists of several partial plans or projects
with various purposes, implemented separately, is not a file, but the separate
projects are. For, without some of the partial projects there would still be a
main plan, though smaller. All activities with respect to building control are
also considered a file, just like a policy document directed at a specific goal
(like a document on how to enhance the position of young people on the
housing market). The files are deliberately not called cases, since three cases
have been chosen as the objects of analysis.
Since each file consists of interrelated decisions, any EU influence on a file
consequently means that it affects all separate decisions. An example is a
restructuring project enabled with European money. Not only the decision
to restructure, but also the decision to hire a specific contractor, the decisions
on colour and size of the pavements, the width of the cycling lane, or the way
citizens are allowed to have their say etc. would not have been taken if there
had not been any European funding.
Taking files instead of decisions as the unit of analysis is not only advan-
tageous because it makes the scope of the research manageable. It also fits in
with the way municipalities organize their work, e.g. in project teams or
groups of officials, and how they document and arrange their activities — in
the archives documents are primarily grouped according to subject, and not
to period or department.
Selection of Files
How to select the files? In order to prevent focusing on trivia, the study was
started with an analysis of the decision lists of 2003–June 2004 of the exec-
utive boards of the mayor and aldermen of Almere and Lelystad, and of the
executive board of the province. These are the boards where political and
administrative spheres convene and where all important and topical issues
are dealt with. Every issue (formalities excluded) was scored to which policy
area it pertained, after which the decisions were grouped under common
denominators or themes, e.g. city extensions in the area of housing; industrial
estates in the area of physical planning; waste collection within the area of
environmental issues. The most frequently occurring themes on the lists were
selected. The themes were further subdivided in files. In many cases this was
possible by looking at the explanation of the board decision(s). In other cases
desk research and conversations with municipal officers were needed. In
every main theme interviews were used to check whether important files on
decision making in the period of January 2003 to June 2004 had been
missed. Finally, sixty-six files in Lelystad, eighty-six in Almere and fifty-one
in the province were selected.
Collecting and Interpreting the Data
To detect whether the cases faced any European constraints or, alternatively,
seized the opportunities the EU has to offer, two methods were deployed:
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document analysis and interviews. The documents consisted of all possible
paper work, varying from general plans and sketches to detailed drawings,
bills and accounts. Also email and other correspondence were consulted.
Interviews were held with the civil servants who had the most knowledge of
the file. The findings from the analysis of the documents were checked in the
interviews, as well as — if needed — the reverse. In total forty interviews
were held.
In all files two questions were always asked: has there been any financial
or other support and has the concerned case experienced any constraints in
the realization of its plans? In the case of direct European influence, it was
obvious that the EU has played a role. Yet, to uncover any indirect influence
required investigation of the background of any support of or constraint by
central or provincial government, since it is possible that higher tiers acted as
a messenger. A few cases thus entailed consulting provincial and national
plans or employees.
Finally, application of both ways of reasoning does not yet yield a
comprehensive picture of the extent to which all local activities are influ-
enced by the EU, since the study was confined to the files in the areas in
which most of the board’s decision making takes place, leaving aside the
areas of sports, welfare and recreation, education and culture. In these
minor fields Dutch SNAs are certainly no passive players. In order to be as
complete as possible additional interviews were held. Any possible Euro-
pean influence indicated by an interviewee was verified by further docu-
ment study.
In the characterization of the detected opportunities, no normative judge-
ment was made. Particularly in the case of European funding, strict criteria
were needed to assess whether we should speak of invitation, facilitation, or
enabling. Invitation exists when a government develops an entirely new
plan or initiative in response to a certain European incentive. The docu-
ments and interviews should indicate that in the period before, the
concerned plan or idea had not been discussed or already developed. In case
of facilitation the initiative already existed and the European money fastens
the implementation of the plan or enlarges it. Typically, this will be a plan
that is already being implemented, or a plan for which the government has
already found financing from other sources. European funds have an
enabling effect if an initiative would not have been developed or cannot be
developed otherwise. Indicative of enabling are plans or desires that already
existed before the funding, but could not be carried out at the time.
Another example is a new plan heavily funded by European money, of
which it is acknowledged that without this money the whole project would
be cancelled.
Not only European funds, but also European rules may facilitate decision
making, such as the ones concerning free competition and public tender. The
latter, in particular, may be welcomed, since they burst a possible local tradi-
tion of clientism. To assess this kind of facilitation, it is difficult to refrain
from normative interpretation. Therefore, a European rule was only consid-
ered as having facilitated decision making if in written documents of the
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Vr
ij
e 
Un
iv
er
si
te
it
, 
Li
br
ar
y]
 A
t:
 1
5:
27
 3
1 
Ma
y 
20
11
80 Frederik Fleurke & Rolf Willemse
government board there is an explicit reference to the rule and it positive
effects.
Also, in assessing the type of constraints normative notions of whether the
concerning European rules should be welcomed or not were not taken into
account. Only an assessment was made of whether the EU induced local
policy changes or initiatives, for better or for worse, therewith giving the
concept of constraints a rather rational-technical connotation. Enforcement,
then, is fairly easy to detect, as there should be a formal command to under-
take something. Hampering and obstruction are more difficult to discern
empirically. We scored a file as hampered if, for example, a certain rule
delays the implementation of a certain plan (resulting in extra costs and
possible claims), if it limits policy discretion, or if it leads to obligatory
changes in initial plans not undermining the central ideas of the plan. An
example of the latter would be a plan for a luxury holiday park near a
special protection zone falling under the Bird Directive. The case where the
province would demand a local authority to reduce the planned area to such
an extent that certain special species will not be endangered, would be called
hampering. On the other hand, if it would force the authorities to abandon
the whole plan — also if it is part of a larger plan — this would be classified
as obstruction.
Obstruction may not only exist in the case of abandoned plans or unfin-
ished or unformalized decisions, it may also imply non-existing decision
making. To assess the possible presence of this type of obstruction, a path
was followed that had been developed successfully previously by Fleurke &
Willemse (2006b). A non-decision is a policy desire that (1) cannot be
fulfilled, (2) is consequently not decided upon, (3) is broadly supported (i.e.
by both board and council members) and (4) is frequently expressed in at
least two consecutive years. To detect non-decisions analysis was made of the
minutes of the meetings of the municipal and provincial councils — the ones
of the discussions on the annual budget in particular — since substantial non-
decisions are most likely expressed in the political debate. If necessary, find-
ings were checked in an interview with the griffier (registrar) of the council.
Finally, files may be encountered in which the EU is mentioned, but for
which this conceptualization and operationalization is inadequate. A
European obligation to tender publicly that is followed without complain-
ing, that does not change the content of the concerning plan, or that even
codifies an already existing practice, is such a situation. Another example is
an obligation to perform a test to determine whether any bird protected by
the Bird Directive is endangered. If the outcome is negative, there is no
substantive European impact since it does not result in any significant
changes in the plans. Government has ‘just’ followed a procedure or
complied with a rule (as it does with so many national or sub-national
rules), experiencing at most some financial setback due to research activi-
ties. This type of influence will be called procedural effects; though EU rules
do penetrate sub-national administrative practice, they do this in a proce-
dural manner only. In this case the EU neither enhances, nor constrains
decision making.
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Results
Extent, Direction and Type of Influence
As Table 2 indicates, in the three cases the EU influences sub-national deci-
sion making in a fair to substantial degree. European rules and directives
have affected a third (Almere) to half of the files (Lelystad and Flevoland).
Making a distinction between direct and indirect influence, a pronounced
difference is noticed: in the researched municipalities nearly all European
influence is indirect, and in the province a majority is direct. The bulk of the
EU’s influence is exerted through the province, which allocates European
money and tests municipal spatial plans against national and European rules.
In a few cases the water board in the province (applying directives on water
quality) and central government play an intermediary role. This also holds
for the province itself (e.g. in case of application of central rules which are an
implementation of European norms). Yet, if the EU plays a role in the
province it is much more direct. This appeared to be particularly true for
European subsidies about which the province has direct contact with the
European Commission, and which it receives directly.
If the EU influences sub-national decision making, does it do this in an
enhancing or constraining way? Table 3 breaks down the influence into the
different types in the conceptual model. It can be noticed immediately that
Lelystad’s decision making has been enhanced much more than constrained
by the EU. Though much less pronounced, the same is true for Almere, but
the reverse can be said for the province.
In the case of constraints, hampering is the most common way the EU
affects sub-national administrative practice. Facilitation is generally the most
commonly provided opportunity. The other types of influence do occur, but
much less frequently, resulting in rather small differences between the three
governments.
In Table 3 one further notices that obstruction sometimes occurs. In these
cases it concerns parts of plans that were abandoned during the formal deci-
sion-making procedures. Analysis of the minutes of municipal and provincial
Table 2. EU influence as percentages of files, and direct or indirect influence as percentages 
of influenced files
Municipality of 
Lelystad
Municipalit
y of Almere
Province of 
Flevoland
No effect 51.5 64.2 45.1
Effect 48.5 35.8 54.9
of which direct 12.5 16.7 61.5
of which indirect 96.9 86.7 46.2
n 66 81 51
Note: n of Almere is less than the initial amount of 86 selected files, because of five missing files in the 
area of physical planning. Numbers of direct and indirect influence do not add up to 100, because the EU 
can influence a file in both ways.
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council meetings of 1996–2004 did not uncover any further strong desires
that never made it to the drawing board.
Policy Areas
On which policy areas is the influence of the EU most manifest? Table 4
shows that the EU influences local decision making quite strongly (that is, in
Table 3. Types of EU influence, in percentages of EU influenced files
Municipality of 
Lelystad Municipality of AlmereProvince of Flevoland
Enforcement 3.1 0.0 10.7
Hampering 25.0 34.5 53.6
Obstruction 6.3 13.8 0.0
Total constraints 34.4 48.3 57.1
Invitation 3.1 3.4 17.9
Facilitation 65.6 41.4 35.7
Enabling 12.5 6.9 14.3
Total opportunities 81.3 55.2 53.6
n 32 29 28
Note: Totals do not add up to 100, because e.g. decision making may be enhanced (through funding) as 
well as constrained (by a directive).
Table 4. EU influence on major policy areas expressed in percentages of files of each area, 
total and in terms of constraints (Con) and opportunities (Opp)
Municipality of Lelystad Municipality of Almere Province of Flevoland
Total Con Opp n Total Con Opp n Total Con Opp n
ES&G 70.6 23.5 58.8 17 63.6 40.9 28.0 22 72.0 60.0 40.0 25
EA 64.3 28.6 50.0 14 61.1 27.8 42.1 19 72.0 36.0 44.0 25
WW — — 77.8 66.7 11.1 9
T&T 64.0 8.0 60.0 25 — 44.4 44.4 0.0 9
PP 62.5 20.0 50.0 40 36.0 24.0 17.0 50 73.9 56.5 30.4 23
Housing 50.0 20.8 37.5 24 32.1 28.6 3.6 28 —
SA 40.0 20.0 40.0 5 42.9 0.0 42.9 7 —
PO&S 22.2 11.1 11.1 9 14.3 0.0 14.3 7 —
PW&R 18.2 0.0 18.2 11 20.0 0.0 20.0 10 14.3 0.0 14.3 7
Culture — 16.7 0.0 16.7 6 12.5 0.0 12.5 8
Sports — 28.6 14.3 0.0 7 —
Education — 30.0 10.0 20.0 10 —
ES&G, Environment, Sanitation & Green; EA, Economic Affairs; WW, Water Works; T&T, Transport & 
Traffic; PP, Physical Planning; SA, Social Affairs; PO&S, Public Order & Safety; PW&R, Public Welfare 
& Recreation. —, less than five files were found.
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at least half of the files) in the areas belonging to the so-called physical
infrastructure (the use of territory), and relatively weakly in areas belonging
to the social infrastructure (demarcated with a dotted line in Table 4). The
EU manifests itself at the sub-national level in environmental and economic
issues, as well as on physical matters. Interestingly enough, though with
small variations in all these areas, the EU constrains and enhances decision
making at the same time. There appears to be only one substantial difference
between the cases — apart from the fact not all areas score equally — which
is the level of the European influence on physical planning. In Almere this is
relatively low. Also, the province is confronted relatively often with
constraining activities of the EU, whereas for both municipalities the
European opportunities are more visible.
Additional interviews were held to ascertain that research had not missed
any substantial influence in other areas (such as education, culture, sport and
welfare and recreation). Respondents recognized the initial findings that
these areas receive relatively little political and administrative attention. A
telling characterization of these municipal activities was ‘try’n keep the holes
plugged’.
Legislation, Funding and Their Effects
Which instruments did the EU use (deliberately or not)? What kind of files
does the EU mostly affect? Though the conceptual framework does not rule
out the possibility that directives have an enhancing effect, it was found that
in almost all files where European legislation plays a role it does so in a
constraining way (95 per cent). Similarly, 95 per cent of all enhancing
European effects can be traced back to the European funds. An exception —
an example of invitation — is a local waste plan with which Lelystad tried to
conform to a national waste plan. This central plan was partially an imple-
mentation of the EU Waste Directive. Because Lelystad did not have an
obligation to set up its own plans accordingly, it apparently foresaw positive
implications in doing so.
Which European rules play a constraining role? In the municipalities of
Lelystad and Almere the Habitat and Bird Directive play a prominent role.
For example, in two files the province withheld its consent to the respective
zoning plans of Lelystad, since there was — with an explicit appeal to the
Habitat Directive — not enough evidence that plans to build houses and a
regatta centre outside the dykes would not substantially harm the habitat of
the smew (Mergus Albellus). As a consequence, the original plans have been
mothballed for three to four years. It is not likely that the original plans will
be carried out completely by then. A similar thing happened to Almere’s
plans for an industrial zone near a nature reserve where the hen and marsh
harrier (Circus Cyaneus and Circus Aeruginosis) have their habitat. The Bird
and Habitat Directive have an effect on provincial decision making too, since
they constitute criteria with which the province scrutinizes the municipals’
physical planning and protection of valuable nature. The same applies to
licenses and permits in the areas of environment, waste and water. In its
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review procedures the province is obliged to apply many criteria that can be
traced back directly to European directives.
Several files were found in which a certain European rule was mentioned
and applied, but with no substantial consequences. In particular the Direc-
tive on Public Tender has a mere procedural effect. In three files the same can
be said about the Habitat and Bird Directive; obligatory tests were done,
along with all other procedural requirements, but without any further conse-
quences. The same applies to tests on air pollution, required by the European
directive on national emission ceilings for certain atmospheric pollutants,
and performed during the development of all zoning plans; in none of the
cases (expected) were emissions so high that initial plans had to be changed
or abandoned.
As has been said, the EU has exerted its enhancing influence mostly
through European funds. Since the province manages most European funds
and allocates them to the municipalities, citizen groups and private firms, a
direct relation exists between the EU and Flevoland, and an indirect one
between the EU and Almere and Lelystad. Almere and Lelystad have reaped
benefits from the European Fund for Regional Development (EFRD; in
twenty-nine files) and, to a much lesser extent, from the European Social
Fund (ESF; four files). Respondents in both municipalities and the province
related that in the distribution of the allowances the province does not apply
additional criteria to the already existing European ones. If a plan meets
these norms, the principle ‘first come, first served’ is followed.
One may expect that this principle induces local authorities to invent
projects that otherwise would not have existed. During research no convincing
examples of such kinds of invitation were found. On the other hand, in most
files in Lelystad (sixteen out of twenty-one) and Almere (twelve out of four-
teen), the funding can be characterized as having facilitated decision making.
Many urban renewal projects in Lelystad are funded by the EFRD, but, consid-
ering for example a Wijkontwikkelingsplan — a plan to renew a certain part
of town and consisting of all kinds of files, the amount of European money
is relatively small (20 per cent on a total of €18.5 million). Central government
also subsidizes urban renewal as it has been doing for decades. Moreover,
plans for regeneration had been made already in the mid-1990s, well before
there was any certainty about possible European funding. Another striking
example of facilitation is a new railway station in Almere. When the funding
was granted the station had been realized almost completely; the European
money turned out to be no more than an extra. This is not to say that the EU
has never enabled new projects. If it does so, it is through the ESF with which
Almere and Lelystad have financed several integration and safety projects, the
continuation of which will be endangered if the ESF-budget dries up.
With respect to the province there are similar findings. Flevoland is
involved in twelve EU subsidy programmes, of which not one can be consid-
ered as enabling decision making. In three cases one can speak of invitation
(two interregional projects and Leader +) and in one of enforcement (subsi-
dies for the EU-driven restructuring of the fishery). With respect to projects
seeking other funds — European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund
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(EAGGF), EFRD, ESF, parts of the Financial Instrument for Fisheries
Guidance (FIFG) — it is difficult to maintain that these institutions helped to
develop long-desired projects that would not have come about otherwise.
Indeed, judging from the deliberation of the provincial board on the socio-
economic development of the area and looking at the budgets at the begin-
ning of the 1990s, nothing indicated that Flevoland suffered from a chronic
lack of means. In 1995 it became clear that the province was eligible for Euro-
pean funding. It was central government that lobbied for the designation of
Flevoland as a developing region, and not the province itself. A well-known
anecdote is that the Prime Minister phoned the Queen’s Commissioner of
Flevoland with the question of ‘whether the province wanted to be poor’.
Given this, it was not unexpected to find more feelings of surprise and aston-
ishment than of relief in the minutes of the board and in articles in the press
of that period.1
Conclusions
There are a number of conclusions from this study. First, the EU influences
sub-national decision making to a fairly large extent. Though one could
expect some European influence because of the selective criteria used in
choosing the cases, it is still felt that the resulting percentage of EU-
influenced files (c. fifty) is fairly high. This conclusion is strengthened by the
fact that this figure includes only substantive influence. If the study also
included all merely procedural obligations stemming from European rules,
the European impact on sub-national decision making is even higher. In any
case the position in the literature that the EU does not affect the position of
SNAs cannot be upheld when considering daily administrative practice.
A second conclusion is that the EU constrains sub-national decision
making as well as enhancing it. This is an important finding, since judging by
the existing literature it would seem that the EU either enhances or constrains
sub-national decision making. This picture arises because of the essentially
different choices in the objects of analysis that are made by the proponents
of the two seemingly contending positions. The research presented here, in
which the focus is on the daily work of SNAs, unmistakably shows that the
EU plays both roles: with its money it enhances sub-national decision making
and, through its legislation — in particular the Bird and Habitat Directives,
the Waste Directive and several directives on the protection of water quality,
it constrains SNAs’ decision making.
Thirdly, though the EU is clearly present at the sub-national level, it is not
omnipresent. Its role differs per area. The extent and nature of EU influence
is contingent on the specific context and problems with which a SNA is
coping. Not all SNAs have valuable nature reserves within their territory
and, even if this is the case, not all will pursue an extensive physical develop-
ment policy. Similarly the extent and nature of EU influence is determined
partially by the formal responsibilities a SNA has in various areas (which
may explain possible cross-national variations). European rules on water
quality and waste collection in principal apply to all SNAs equally, but, since
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Vr
ij
e 
Un
iv
er
si
te
it
, 
Li
br
ar
y]
 A
t:
 1
5:
27
 3
1 
Ma
y 
20
11
86 Frederik Fleurke & Rolf Willemse
in the Dutch system many formal responsibilities in these areas have been
attributed to the province, it is the province where one finds the most EU
influence in these areas.
A fourth conclusion is that the EU steers in a direct manner and an indirect
manner. It appears that the SNA’s position in the national administrative
system determines which manner dominates. The EU seldom has a direct
impact on the municipalities; most of its influence on this smallest unit is
indirect through the mediation of central and provincial government, and
occasionally of water boards. If the EU steers the province indirectly, it is
often via central government and water boards. Given its intermediate
administrative position as a ‘regional’ government, direct EU influence on
the province is more frequent.
Further, when in these cases the EU enhanced the decision making, it did
so by facilitating the decision making — making already existing projects
bigger, cheaper or speeding up the implementation — and not by enabling
new long-desired projects. This is quite striking since this enabling is essen-
tially the objective of the European funds; it is in contrast with the suggestion
in the literature on multi-level governance that the position of SNAs is
strengthened or that the European funds make the impossible possible. This
is not to say that the European funds do not enable projects elsewhere or are
not needed in poorer regions in Europe. The results make clear, however, that
the European influence on sub-national administrative practice is much more
differentiated than is often suggested in the literature. The typology of influ-
ence used here has proven sensitive enough to uncover such differentiations.
Sixthly, the current European programme in Flevoland ends in 2006 and
the officials are well aware that funding after this period will be much
smaller, and therefore will diminish the extent to which their decision
making is enhanced. On the other hand, the constraining European directives
still exist and there are no indications this will change in the next years. If
one dares to take a glance in the near future the EU may predominantly
constrain Dutch sub-national decision making instead of enhancing it.
Finally, these results come from only three cases in just one of the twenty-
five member states of the EU. Application of the conceptual framework to a
greater number of SNAs, to different SNAs and to different states will result
in a more nuanced picture of the various kinds of influence of the EU on
local, regional and provincial administrative practice.
Note
1. The reason why Flevoland was eligible was its Regional Gross Product, which was below the Euro-
pean average. Yet, unemployment figures were more or less standard. Most people in Flevoland did
have work, though not in their own region: Flevoland was a commuter region.
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